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nextcloud-mcp-server/nextcloud_mcp_server/auth/unified_verifier.py
T
Chris Coutinho 9fab6cb550 feat: Implement ADR-005 unified token verifier to eliminate token passthrough vulnerability
Replace two non-compliant token verifiers (NextcloudTokenVerifier and
ProgressiveConsentTokenVerifier) with a single UnifiedTokenVerifier that properly
validates token audiences per MCP Security Best Practices specification.

The previous implementation had a critical security vulnerability where tokens
intended for the MCP server were passed directly to Nextcloud APIs without
proper audience validation (token passthrough anti-pattern). This violates
OAuth 2.0 security principles and the MCP specification.

Changes:
- Add UnifiedTokenVerifier supporting two compliant modes:
  * Multi-audience mode (default): Validates tokens contain BOTH MCP and
    Nextcloud audiences, enabling direct use without exchange
  * Token exchange mode (opt-in): Validates MCP audience only, exchanges
    for Nextcloud tokens via RFC 8693 with caching to minimize latency

- Remove token passthrough vulnerability from context.py and context_helper.py
- Implement token exchange caching (5-minute TTL default) to reduce network calls
- Add required environment variables for audience validation:
  * NEXTCLOUD_MCP_SERVER_URL - MCP server URL (used as audience)
  * NEXTCLOUD_RESOURCE_URI - Nextcloud resource identifier
  * TOKEN_EXCHANGE_CACHE_TTL - Cache TTL for exchanged tokens

- Update docker-compose.yml with resource URI configuration for both OAuth modes
- Add comprehensive test suite (29 tests) covering both authentication modes
- Remove legacy NextcloudTokenVerifier and ProgressiveConsentTokenVerifier

Security improvements:
- Eliminates token passthrough anti-pattern
- Enforces proper audience separation between MCP and Nextcloud
- Complies with MCP Security Best Practices and RFC 8707/8693
- Maintains performance with token exchange caching

Test results: 65/65 unit tests passed, 5/5 smoke tests passed

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-05 18:53:14 +01:00

476 lines
17 KiB
Python

"""
Unified Token Verifier for ADR-005 Token Audience Validation.
This module replaces both NextcloudTokenVerifier and ProgressiveConsentTokenVerifier
with a single implementation that supports two compliant OAuth modes:
1. Multi-audience mode (default): Tokens must contain BOTH MCP and Nextcloud audiences
2. Token exchange mode (opt-in): Tokens have MCP audience only, exchanged for Nextcloud tokens
Key Design Principles:
- Token verification happens HERE (validates audiences)
- Token exchange happens in context_helper.py (when creating NextcloudClient)
- No token passthrough allowed (complies with MCP Security Specification)
"""
import hashlib
import logging
import time
from typing import Any
import httpx
import jwt
from jwt import PyJWKClient
from mcp.server.auth.provider import AccessToken, TokenVerifier
from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import Settings
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class UnifiedTokenVerifier(TokenVerifier):
"""
Unified token verifier supporting both multi-audience and token exchange modes.
Compliant with MCP security specification - no token pass-through.
This verifier:
1. Validates tokens using JWT verification with JWKS or introspection fallback
2. Enforces proper audience validation based on configured mode
3. Caches successful validations to avoid repeated API calls
Mode Selection (via ENABLE_TOKEN_EXCHANGE setting):
- False/omit (default): Multi-audience mode - requires BOTH MCP and Nextcloud audiences
- True: Exchange mode - requires MCP audience only (exchange happens later)
"""
def __init__(self, settings: Settings):
"""
Initialize the unified token verifier.
Args:
settings: Application settings containing OAuth configuration
"""
self.settings = settings
self.mode = "exchange" if settings.enable_token_exchange else "multi-audience"
# Common components for all modes
self.http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0)
# JWT verification support
self.jwks_client: PyJWKClient | None = None
if hasattr(settings, "jwks_uri") and settings.jwks_uri:
logger.info(f"JWT verification enabled with JWKS URI: {settings.jwks_uri}")
self.jwks_client = PyJWKClient(settings.jwks_uri, cache_keys=True)
# Introspection support (for opaque tokens)
self.introspection_uri: str | None = None
if (
hasattr(settings, "introspection_uri")
and settings.introspection_uri
and settings.oidc_client_id
and settings.oidc_client_secret
):
self.introspection_uri = settings.introspection_uri
logger.info(f"Token introspection enabled: {self.introspection_uri}")
# Token cache: token_hash -> (userinfo, expiry_timestamp)
self._token_cache: dict[str, tuple[dict[str, Any], float]] = {}
self.cache_ttl = 3600 # 1 hour default
logger.info(
f"UnifiedTokenVerifier initialized in {self.mode} mode. "
f"MCP audience: {settings.oidc_client_id} or {settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url}, "
f"Nextcloud resource URI: {settings.nextcloud_resource_uri}"
)
async def verify_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
"""
Verify token according to MCP TokenVerifier protocol.
CRITICAL: This method only validates tokens - it does NOT perform exchange.
Token exchange happens later in context_helper.py when creating NextcloudClient.
Multi-audience mode: Validates token has BOTH MCP and Nextcloud audiences
Exchange mode: Validates token has MCP audience ONLY (exchange happens later)
Args:
token: Bearer token to verify
Returns:
AccessToken if valid, None if invalid or expired
"""
# Check cache first
cached = self._get_cached_token(token)
if cached:
logger.debug("Token found in cache")
return cached
# Verify based on mode
if self.mode == "multi-audience":
return await self._verify_multi_audience_token(token)
else:
# Exchange mode: Only validate MCP audience here
# Actual exchange happens in context_helper.py
return await self._verify_mcp_audience_only(token)
async def _verify_multi_audience_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
"""
Validate token has both MCP and Nextcloud audiences (Mode 1).
Token can be used directly without exchange.
Args:
token: Bearer token to verify
Returns:
AccessToken if valid with both audiences, None otherwise
"""
try:
# Attempt JWT verification first
if self._is_jwt_format(token) and self.jwks_client:
payload = await self._verify_jwt_signature(token)
else:
# Fall back to introspection for opaque tokens
payload = await self._introspect_token(token)
if not payload:
return None
# Check payload is valid
if not payload:
return None
# Validate both audiences are present
if not self._validate_multi_audience(payload):
audiences = payload.get("aud", [])
logger.error(
f"Token rejected: Missing required audiences. "
f"Got {audiences}, need both MCP ({self.settings.oidc_client_id} or "
f"{self.settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url}) AND Nextcloud "
f"({self.settings.nextcloud_resource_uri})"
)
return None
logger.info(
"Multi-audience validation passed - token has both MCP and Nextcloud audiences"
)
return self._create_access_token(token, payload)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Multi-audience validation failed: {e}")
return None
async def _verify_mcp_audience_only(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
"""
Validate token has MCP audience only (Mode 2).
Token will be exchanged later in context_helper.py.
Args:
token: Bearer token to verify
Returns:
AccessToken if valid with MCP audience, None otherwise
"""
try:
# Attempt JWT verification first
if self._is_jwt_format(token) and self.jwks_client:
payload = await self._verify_jwt_signature(token)
else:
# Fall back to introspection for opaque tokens
payload = await self._introspect_token(token)
if not payload:
return None
# Check payload is valid
if not payload:
return None
# Only validate MCP audience (exchange will handle Nextcloud)
if not self._has_mcp_audience(payload):
audiences = payload.get("aud", [])
logger.error(
f"Token rejected: Missing MCP audience. "
f"Got {audiences}, need {self.settings.oidc_client_id} "
f"or {self.settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url}"
)
return None
logger.info(
"MCP audience validation passed - token will be exchanged for Nextcloud access"
)
return self._create_access_token(token, payload)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"MCP audience validation failed: {e}")
return None
def _validate_multi_audience(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""
Check if token has both MCP and Nextcloud audiences.
Args:
payload: Decoded token payload
Returns:
True if both audiences present, False otherwise
"""
audiences = payload.get("aud", [])
if isinstance(audiences, str):
audiences = [audiences]
audiences_set = set(audiences)
# MCP must have at least one: client_id OR server_url
mcp_valid = self.settings.oidc_client_id in audiences_set or (
self.settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url
and self.settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url in audiences_set
)
# Nextcloud must have its resource URI
nextcloud_valid = bool(
self.settings.nextcloud_resource_uri
and self.settings.nextcloud_resource_uri in audiences_set
)
return bool(mcp_valid and nextcloud_valid)
def _has_mcp_audience(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""
Check if token has MCP audience (for exchange mode).
Args:
payload: Decoded token payload
Returns:
True if MCP audience present, False otherwise
"""
audiences = payload.get("aud", [])
if isinstance(audiences, str):
audiences = [audiences]
audiences_set = set(audiences)
return bool(
self.settings.oidc_client_id in audiences_set
or (
self.settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url
and self.settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url in audiences_set
)
)
def _is_jwt_format(self, token: str) -> bool:
"""
Check if token looks like a JWT (has 3 parts separated by dots).
Args:
token: The token to check
Returns:
True if token appears to be JWT format
"""
return "." in token and token.count(".") == 2
async def _verify_jwt_signature(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""
Verify JWT token with signature validation using JWKS.
Args:
token: JWT token to verify
Returns:
Decoded payload if valid, None if invalid
"""
try:
assert self.jwks_client is not None # Caller should check before calling
# Get signing key from JWKS
signing_key = self.jwks_client.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token)
# Verify and decode JWT
# Note: We don't validate audience here - that's done separately based on mode
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
signing_key.key,
algorithms=["RS256"],
issuer=self.settings.oidc_issuer
if hasattr(self.settings, "oidc_issuer")
else None,
options={
"verify_signature": True,
"verify_exp": True,
"verify_iat": True,
"verify_iss": True
if hasattr(self.settings, "oidc_issuer")
and self.settings.oidc_issuer
else False,
"verify_aud": False, # We handle audience validation separately
},
)
logger.debug(f"JWT signature verified for user: {payload.get('sub')}")
return payload
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
logger.info("JWT token has expired")
return None
except jwt.InvalidIssuerError as e:
logger.warning(f"JWT issuer validation failed: {e}")
return None
except jwt.InvalidTokenError as e:
logger.warning(f"JWT validation failed: {e}")
return None
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Unexpected error during JWT verification: {e}")
return None
async def _introspect_token(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""
Validate token by calling the introspection endpoint (RFC 7662).
Args:
token: Bearer token to introspect
Returns:
Token payload if active, None if inactive or invalid
"""
if not self.introspection_uri:
logger.debug("No introspection endpoint configured")
return None
try:
# Introspection requires client authentication
response = await self.http_client.post(
self.introspection_uri,
data={"token": token},
auth=(self.settings.oidc_client_id, self.settings.oidc_client_secret),
)
if response.status_code == 200:
introspection_data = response.json()
# Check if token is active
if not introspection_data.get("active", False):
logger.info("Token introspection returned inactive=false")
return None
logger.debug(
f"Token introspected successfully for user: {introspection_data.get('sub')}"
)
return introspection_data
elif response.status_code in (400, 401, 403):
logger.warning(
f"Token introspection failed: HTTP {response.status_code}. "
f"Response: {response.text[:200] if response.text else 'empty'}"
)
return None
else:
logger.warning(
f"Unexpected response from introspection: {response.status_code}. "
f"Response: {response.text[:200] if response.text else 'empty'}"
)
return None
except httpx.TimeoutException:
logger.error("Timeout while introspecting token")
return None
except httpx.RequestError as e:
logger.error(f"Network error while introspecting token: {e}")
return None
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Unexpected error during token introspection: {e}")
return None
def _create_access_token(
self, token: str, payload: dict[str, Any]
) -> AccessToken | None:
"""
Create AccessToken object from validated token payload.
Args:
token: The bearer token
payload: Validated token payload
Returns:
AccessToken object or None if required fields missing
"""
# Extract username (sub claim, with fallback to preferred_username)
username = payload.get("sub") or payload.get("preferred_username")
if not username:
logger.error(
"No 'sub' or 'preferred_username' claim found in token payload"
)
return None
# Extract scopes from scope claim (space-separated string)
scope_string = payload.get("scope", "")
scopes = scope_string.split() if scope_string else []
logger.debug(
f"Extracted scopes from token - scope claim: '{scope_string}' -> scopes list: {scopes}"
)
# Extract expiration
exp = payload.get("exp")
if not exp:
logger.warning("No 'exp' claim in token, using default TTL")
exp = int(time.time() + self.cache_ttl)
# Cache the result
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
userinfo = {
"sub": username,
"scope": scope_string,
**{k: v for k, v in payload.items() if k not in ["sub", "scope"]},
}
self._token_cache[token_hash] = (userinfo, exp)
return AccessToken(
token=token,
client_id=payload.get("client_id", ""),
scopes=scopes,
expires_at=exp,
resource=username, # Store username in resource field (RFC 8707)
)
def _get_cached_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
"""
Retrieve a token from cache if not expired.
Args:
token: The bearer token to look up
Returns:
AccessToken if cached and valid, None otherwise
"""
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
if token_hash not in self._token_cache:
return None
userinfo, expiry = self._token_cache[token_hash]
# Check if expired
if time.time() >= expiry:
logger.debug("Cached token expired, removing from cache")
del self._token_cache[token_hash]
return None
# Return cached AccessToken
username = userinfo.get("sub") or userinfo.get("preferred_username")
scope_string = userinfo.get("scope", "")
scopes = scope_string.split() if scope_string else []
return AccessToken(
token=token,
client_id=userinfo.get("client_id", ""),
scopes=scopes,
expires_at=int(expiry),
resource=username,
)
def clear_cache(self):
"""Clear the token cache."""
self._token_cache.clear()
logger.debug("Token cache cleared")
async def close(self):
"""Cleanup resources."""
await self.http_client.aclose()
logger.debug("Unified token verifier closed")