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Author SHA1 Message Date
Chris Coutinho 0c9a9ea24d fix: Consolidate OAuth callbacks and implement PKCE for all flows 
This PR fixes multiple OAuth-related issues:

## Unified OAuth Callback
- Consolidated `/oauth/callback-nextcloud` and `/oauth/login-callback` into single `/oauth/callback` endpoint
- Flow type determined by session lookup via state parameter (no query params in redirect_uri)
- Fixes redirect_uri validation issues with IdPs requiring exact match
- Legacy endpoints kept as aliases for backwards compatibility

## PKCE Implementation
- Implemented PKCE (RFC 7636) for Flow 2 (resource provisioning)
  - Generate code_verifier and code_challenge
  - Store code_verifier in session storage
  - Retrieve and use in token exchange
- Fixed PKCE for browser login (integrated mode)
  - Previously only worked for external IdP (Keycloak)
  - Now works for both Nextcloud OIDC and external IdP

## Login Elicitation Fixes (ADR-006)
- Fixed elicitation URL to route through MCP server endpoint
  - Changed from direct Nextcloud URL to `/oauth/authorize-nextcloud`
  - Ensures PKCE is properly handled by server
- Fixed login detection after OAuth flow completes
  - Look up refresh token by state parameter instead of user_id
  - Works even when Flow 1 token not present
- Added `get_refresh_token_by_provisioning_client_id()` method

## Session Authentication
- Fixed `/user/page` redirect loop
  - Shared oauth_context with mounted browser_app
  - SessionAuthBackend can now validate sessions correctly

## Tests
- Added comprehensive login elicitation test suite
- Updated scope authorization test expectations
- All 43 OAuth tests passing

## Files Changed
- `app.py`: Shared oauth_context, unified callback route
- `oauth_routes.py`: Unified callback, PKCE for Flow 2
- `browser_oauth_routes.py`: PKCE for integrated mode
- `oauth_tools.py`: Fixed elicitation URL generation
- `refresh_token_storage.py`: Added lookup by provisioning_client_id
- `test_login_elicitation.py`: New test suite

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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2025-11-07 21:08:55 +01:00
Chris Coutinho 34df5f5b9a feat: Implement dual-tier token exchange (Standard V2 + Legacy V1 impersonation) 
This commit implements and documents both RFC 8693 token exchange tiers
from ADR-002, enabling both production-ready delegation and advanced
impersonation capabilities.

- Enable Keycloak preview features (`--features=preview`) to support
  both Standard V2 and Legacy V1 token exchange modes

- Update Tier 1 status from "NOT IMPLEMENTED" to "IMPLEMENTED (Legacy V1)"
- Add detailed empirical testing results showing:
  - Standard V2 rejects `requested_subject` parameter
  - Legacy V1 accepts parameter but requires impersonation permissions
  - Complete configuration steps for enabling impersonation
- Add comparison table showing when to use each tier
- Add "When to Use" guidance for both tiers
- Document that Tier 2 (Delegation) is the recommended default

- Update docstring to document both Tier 1 and Tier 2 support
- Add tier-specific logging (shows which tier is being used)
- Document permission requirements for Tier 1 impersonation

**tests/integration/auth/test_token_exchange_standard_v2.py**:
- Test delegation without impersonation (Tier 2)
- Verify sub claim remains unchanged (service account identity)
- Verify no special permissions required
- Test exchanged tokens work with Nextcloud APIs
- All tests PASS ✅

**tests/integration/auth/test_token_exchange_legacy_v1.py**:
- Test impersonation with `requested_subject` (Tier 1)
- Verify sub claim changes to target user
- Auto-skip if impersonation permissions not configured
- Document permission requirements in test docstrings
- Test exchanged tokens work with Nextcloud APIs

**tests/manual/test_impersonation.py**:
- Comprehensive impersonation validation script
- Tests both Standard V2 and Legacy V1 behavior
- Decodes JWT tokens to verify sub claim changes
- Validates tokens against Nextcloud APIs

**tests/manual/configure_impersonation.py**:
- Automated permission configuration helper
- Documents manual Keycloak CLI configuration steps

Both token exchange tiers are now fully implemented and tested:

- **Tier 2 (Delegation)** - ✅ RECOMMENDED
  - Standard V2 (production-ready)
  - No special permissions required
  - Service account identity preserved

- **Tier 1 (Impersonation)** - ✅ Advanced use only
  - Legacy V1 (--features=preview required)
  - Requires manual permission grant via Keycloak CLI
  - Subject claim changes to target user

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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2025-11-02 22:03:22 +01:00
Chris Coutinho e26c5128b7 docs: Reject service account tokens as OAuth authentication pattern 
Service account tokens (client_credentials grant) violate OAuth "act on-behalf-of"
principles and have been moved to ADR-002's "Will Not Implement" section.

## Problem Discovery

Testing revealed that service account tokens create Nextcloud user accounts
(e.g., `service-account-nextcloud-mcp-server`) due to user_oidc's bearer
provisioning feature. This violates core OAuth principles:

- ❌ Creates stateful server identity in Nextcloud
- ❌ All actions attributed to service account, not real user
- ❌ Breaks audit trail and user attribution
- ❌ Service account becomes "admin by another name"

## Changes

### Documentation (ADR-002)
- Moved service account (old Tier 1) to "Will Not Implement" section
- Added "OAuth Act On-Behalf-Of Principle" section
- Renumbered tiers:
  - Tier 1: Impersonation (NOT IMPLEMENTED)
  - Tier 2: Delegation via token exchange (IMPLEMENTED)
- Updated status to reflect rejection of service accounts

### Code Warnings
- Added comprehensive warning to KeycloakOAuthClient.get_service_account_token()
- Clarified VALID use: only as subject_token for RFC 8693 token exchange
- Clarified INVALID use: direct API access with service account token

### Supporting Documentation
- CLAUDE.md: Removed outdated "Tier 1" references, added rejection note
- oauth-impersonation-findings.md: Added prominent update banner
- audience-validation-setup.md: Updated tier numbers, added rejection note
- tests/manual/test_token_exchange.py: Added warning comment

## Valid Patterns (ADR-002)

✅ Foreground operations: User's access token from MCP request
✅ Background operations: Token exchange (impersonation/delegation)
✅ Offline access: Refresh tokens with user consent
❌ Service accounts: Creates independent server identity (REJECTED)

## Alternative

If service account pattern is truly needed, use BasicAuth mode instead of
OAuth mode. OAuth mode MUST maintain "act on-behalf-of" semantics.

Related: c12df98 (revert of service account test)

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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2025-11-02 22:03:22 +01:00
Chris Coutinho e331544cee feat: Implement RFC 8693 token exchange for Keycloak (ADR-002 Tier 2) 
Implements OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) enabling the MCP server to
exchange service account tokens for user-scoped tokens. This provides an
alternative to refresh tokens for background operations.

**Core Implementation:**
- Added `get_service_account_token()` method to KeycloakOAuthClient for
  client_credentials grant
- Added `exchange_token_for_user()` method implementing RFC 8693 token exchange
- Fixed Fernet encryption key handling in RefreshTokenStorage (was incorrectly
  base64 decoding already-encoded keys)
- Updated OAuth configuration to support offline_access scope and refresh token
  storage infrastructure

**Keycloak Configuration:**
- Enabled `serviceAccountsEnabled` in realm-export.json
- Added `token.exchange.grant.enabled` attribute
- Added `client.token.exchange.standard.enabled` attribute (required for
  Keycloak 26.2+ Standard Token Exchange V2)
- Fresh Keycloak imports now correctly enable token exchange

**Docker Compose:**
- Added TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY and ENABLE_OFFLINE_ACCESS environment variables
- Created oauth-tokens volume for refresh token storage
- Configured both mcp-oauth and mcp-keycloak services

**Testing & Documentation:**
- Added tests/manual/test_token_exchange.py - Validates complete RFC 8693 flow
- Added tests/manual/test_nextcloud_impersonate.py - Documents session-based
  impersonation limitations
- Added docs/oauth-impersonation-findings.md - Comprehensive investigation
  findings and resolution documentation

**Verified Working:**
✅ Service account token acquisition (client_credentials grant)
✅ RFC 8693 token exchange for internal-to-internal tokens
✅ Exchanged tokens validate with Nextcloud APIs
✅ Keycloak 26.4.2 Standard Token Exchange V2 support

**Known Limitations:**
- User impersonation (requested_subject) requires Keycloak Legacy V1 with
  preview features
- Cross-client token exchange limited to same realm
- Refresh token storage infrastructure ready but unused (MCP protocol limitation)

Dependencies: aiosqlite>=0.20.0

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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2025-11-02 22:03:19 +01:00
Chris Coutinho f34366a260 feat: Add Keycloak OAuth provider support with refresh token storage 
Implements Keycloak as an external OIDC provider following ADR-002
architecture for background job authentication using offline_access.

## Features

- Keycloak OAuth provider with PKCE and offline_access support
- Refresh token storage with Fernet encryption
- Token verifier for both JWT and opaque tokens
- Multi-client validation (realm-level trust)
- Sample configuration for Keycloak integration

## Implementation

### OAuth Provider (keycloak_oauth.py)
- Authorization Code Flow with PKCE
- Refresh token exchange
- OIDC discovery endpoint support
- Token validation with JWKS

### Token Storage (refresh_token_storage.py)
- Encrypted storage using Fernet symmetric encryption
- SQLite backend for persistence
- Token rotation support
- Per-user token management

### Token Verifier Updates
- Support both JWT (self-encoded) and opaque tokens
- JWKS-based JWT signature verification
- Introspection endpoint fallback for opaque tokens
- Scope extraction from both token types

### Configuration
- .env.keycloak.sample: Example configuration with Keycloak URLs
- docs/keycloak-multi-client-validation.md: Realm-level validation documentation
- app-hooks/post-installation/10-install-user_oidc-app.sh: Updated dependencies

## Architecture Notes

- MCP Server is a protected resource (requires OAuth)
- MCP Client initiates OAuth flow and shares refresh tokens
- Refresh tokens enable background operations without admin credentials
- Supports future token exchange delegation when Keycloak implements it

## References

- ADR-002: Vector Database Background Sync Authentication
- RFC 6749: OAuth 2.0 (offline_access, refresh tokens)
- RFC 7517: JSON Web Key (JWK)

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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2025-11-02 22:03:19 +01:00